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III.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

This Court has jurisdiction under Rules 3 and 4, Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure, and Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e).
IV.
A.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Under Utah's burglary statute, can an individual who

has both a lease of real property and the sublessor's invitation
to enter the property commit an unlawful entry or remaining when
neither the lease nor the invitation is revoked?

This issue was

preserved at Tr. Vol. 2, at 54-60 (Motion for Directed Verdict);
R. at 172-73 (Defendant's Motion to Arrest Judgment); R. at 22324 (Rule 24 Motion for New Trial).
B.

Is evidence that one entered a property in the same

manner he had lawfully done dozens of previous times sufficient
to show the person had the specific intent to unlawfully enter or
remain and commit a crime within the premises?

This issue was

preserved at Tr. Vol. 2, at 54-60 (Motion for Directed Verdict);
R. at 172-73 (Defendant's Motion to Arrest Judgment); R. at 22324 (Rule 24 Motion for New Trial).
V.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In a criminal case, the State must produce evidence to
show, beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant committed the
crime charged.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501(1).

1

If the State fails

to produce sufficient evidence as to any one or more of the
necessary elements of the charged offense, the Court must reverse
a jury's verdict of guilt.
(Utah App. 1990).

State v. Becker, 803 P.2d 1290, 1293

Furthermore, legal questions, such as the

meaning of "licensed" or "privileged" under the burglary statute,
or whether the fact of commission of a crime is sufficient to
infer "intent" under the burglary statute, are reviewed for
correctness.
1995).

Corbett v. Seamans. 904 P.2d 229, 1232 (Utah App.

Similarly, whether the plaintiff has established a prima

facie case is also reviewed for correctness.
In reviewing the evidence presented at trial the Court
must view all facts, as well as all reasonable inferences derived
therefrom, in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict.
State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 784 (Utah 1991).

In such a case,

the role of the reviewing court is to neither judge the credibility of witnesses nor review the case as finders of fact.
State v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 543 (Utah 1994).

Rather, review

is limited to the question of whether there is sufficient evidence, including all reasonable inferences, from which each
element of the offense can be shown beyond a reasonable doubt.
State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 285 (Utah 1989).

"[0]nly when

the evidence is so lacking and insubstantial that a reasonable

2

person could not have reached that verdict beyond a reasonable
doubt" will a jury's verdict be overturned.

State v. Isaacson,

704 P.2d 555, 557 (Utah 1985).
VI.

CITATIONS TO DETERMINATIVE STATUTES

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-201 (definitions).
For the purposes of this part:
**•

(3) A person "enters or remains unlawfully"
in or upon premises when the premises or any
portion thereof at the time of the entry or
remaining are not open to the public and when the
actor is not licensed or privileged to enter or
remain on the premises or such portions thereof.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 Burglary
(1) A person is guilty of burglary if he
enters or remains unlawfully in a building or any
portion of a building with intent to commit a
felony or theft or commit an assault on any
person.
***

Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103
A person engages in conduct:
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or
willfully with respect to the nature of his
conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is
his conscious objective or desire to engage in the
conduct or cause the result.
***

3

VII.
A.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings Below.

Defendant seeks review of the Trial Court's denial of
Defendant's motions for Directed Verdict, to Arrest Judgment, and
for a New Trial.

R. at 284-292.

Mr. Hawkins was convicted on or

about June 26, 1996 of burglary, a third-degree felony, and
theft, a Class A misdemeanor.

Mr. Hawkins, through his prior

cousnel, made timely Motions for Directed Verdict and to Arrest
Judgment and through current counsel moved for New Trial.
Vol. 2 at 54-60; R. at 172-73, 223-24.
these motions.
of Appeal.
B.

R. at 284-92.

Tr.,

The trial court denied

Mr. Hawkins filed a timely Notice

R. at 293.
Statement of Facts•

The State charged that on or about January 13, 1996,
Mr. Hawkins committed a burglary of a garage/storage unit located
at 4195 South 500 West, #99 ("unit 99"), Salt Lake City, Utah.
R. at 120 (Amended Information).

Unit 99 is located in a light

industrial complex containing 100 similar units.
194-95.

Tr., Vol. 1, at

Gordon Construction owned the complex and rented the

units to individuals for use as mechanics shops, automobile
painting booths and storage areas.

4

Tr., Vol. 1, at 64, 195.

Gloria Markham leased adjoining units 98 and 99 from
Gordon Construction.

Tr., Vol. 1, at 64.

Units 98 and 99 were

connected by an interior door which had no lock.
148.

Tr., Vol. 1, at

Gloria Markham leased those units in partnership with her

brother Tim Markham.

Tr., Vol. 1, at 68, 85.

Even though Gloria

Markham was the actual lessee of units 98 and 99, Tim Markham was
the one who worked in the units and paid the rent to Gordon
Construction.

Tr., Vol. 1, at 68, 85, 88-89.

Gloria Markham regularly allowed Tim Markham to sublet or
permit others to use units 98 and 99.
36.

Tr., Vol. 1, at 70, 135-

The general arrangement Tim Markham had with people he

allowed to use the units was, "you pay you stay.
you go."

If you don't,

Tr., Vol. 1, at 136, 145.

During the summer of 1995, Tim Markham entered into a
sublease agreement for unit 98 with Mr. Hawkins.
136, 138, 140, 67, 71.

Tr., Vol. 1, at

Mr. Hawkins rented the space in order to

perform auto-body work and painting.

Tr., Vol. 1, at 136-38.

Tim Markham had the same arrangement with Mr. Hawkins he had with
others he permitted to use and enter the units -- "you pay, you
stay.

If you don't you go."1

Tr., Vol. 1, at 136, 169.

As

initially, Mr. Hawkins paid Mr. Markham on a per-car basis.
Tr., Vol. 1, at 136-3 8. That agreement was later modified to a
month-to-month arrangement. Tr., Vol. 1, at 169.
5

rent, Mr. Hawkins paid Mr. Markham one-half of what Mr. Markham
paid to lease both units.

Tr., Vol. 1, at 169.

rent for both shops was $680.

Id.

Thus, Mr. Markham required

Mr. Hawkins to pay a monthly rent of $340.00.
169.

The combined

Tr., Vol. 1, at

Mr. Hawkins usually paid his half of the rent on the units

directly to Mark Gordon.

Tr., Vol. 1, at 170.

Although Mr. Hawkins rented the spaces so he could
perform auto-body repair and painting, he lacked the necessary
tools for that type of work.

Tim Markham testified that tools

such as impact wrenches, pulleys, welders, grinders and spray
guns were essential to auto-body repair work.

Tr., Vol. 1, at

152 (referring to State's Exhibit 3 ) . When Mr. Hawkins began
working in the units, the only tools he brought were a sander and
an air file, which he borrowed from a third person.
at 136.

Tr., Vol. 1,

Thereafter, the only additional tools Mr. Hawkins

acquired were a couple of metal boxes containing sockets,
ratchets and screwdrivers, and an air blower.
172; State's Exhibit 4.

Tr., Vol. 1, at

Therefore, Tim Markham allowed Mr.

Hawkins to use Mr. Markham's tools so Mr. Hawkins could perform
auto body work.

Tr., Vol. 1, at 159, 171.

of his tools in Unit 99.

Tim Markham kept most

Tr., Vol. 1, at 117, 150.

Accordingly,

Mr. Hawkins frequently worked and was seen working in both units

6

98 and 99.

Tr., Vol. 2, at 10, 33.

Indeed, Jim Severns, another

tenant in the complex, understood Mr. Hawkins and Mr. Markham
were sharing units 98 and 99.

Tr., Vol. 2, at 34.

In addition to the few tools Mr. Hawkins had, he kept
several of his personal items in unit 99 including a microwave
oven, dragster brakes, curio cabinet glass doors and a dragster.
Tr., Vol. 1, at 140, 157, 172-73; Tr., Vol. 2, at 99.
Mr. Hawkins frequently worked in the units when Mr.
Markham was not there.

Tr., Vol. 1, at 13 8.

Mr. Hawkins did not

keep a regular schedule of when he worked or would work in the
units.

Tr., Vol. 1, at 138.

Tim Markham testified he knew of at

least four times when Mr. Hawkins worked in the shop during the
middle of the night and, on occasion, would work there through
the night.

Tr., Vol. 1, at 138.

Jim Severns also testified that

it was not unusual to see Mr. Hawkins work in units 98 and 99 all
night long.

Tr., Vol. 2, at 34.

There is nothing in the record

showing Mr. Markham objected to this practice.
Each unit in the complex has two access points: a side
door and a roll-up garage door.

Tr., Vol. 1, at 101, 195.

Markhams had given Mr. Hawkins a key to the side door.

The

Tim

Markham testified that on the occasions Mr. Hawkins did not have
his key with him, he accessed the units by rolling under the

7

roll-up garage door of the unit.

Tr., Vol. 1, at 13 8.

The

garage door of unit 98 was missing a couple of rollers and,
therefore, could not be locked as designed.
147.

Tr., Vol. 1, at 101,

In order to secure the door one would have to "take vice

grips to clamp the door shut so you couldn't raise it up."
Vol. 1, at 14 7-48.

Tr.,

Mr. Hawkins told Mr. Markham he knew how to,

and in fact would, circumvent the vice-grip lock in order to
access the units when he forgot his key to the unit.
1, at 13 8.

Tr., Vol.

Nothing in the record indicates that Mr. Markham

objected to this method of access by Mr. Hawkins.

And, nothing

in the record establishes that prior to January 13, 1996,
Mr. Markham sought from Mr. Hawkins return of the key.
Mr. Hawkins was current with the rent through November
1995.2

Tim Markham testified that in October Mr. Hawkins paid

him $290.00 for rent.

Tr., Vol. 1, at 190.

This amount repre-

sented the amount of rent Mr. Hawkins owed to date.
at 189.

Tr., Vol. 1,

Mark Gordon later testified that Mr. Hawkins paid rent

for the month of November 1995.

Tr., Vol. 1, at 213-14;

Defendant's Exhibit 14.

2

During cross-examination, Mr. Markham conceded that if
Mr. Hawkins was in fact current with the rent through November,
u
he should have come down . . . ." Tr., Vol. 1, at 171.
8

Although Mr. Hawkins' rent was current through November
1995, he seemed to "disappear" near the end of October 1995.
Tr., Vol. 1, at 108, 13 9; Tr., Vol. 2, at 10.

The record shows,

however, he did not remove any of his belongings from units 98
and 99.

Tr., Vol. 1, at 108; Tr., Vol. 2, at 17; State's Exhibit

4.
There is nothing in the record indicating that after
October 1995 the Markhams ever told Mr. Hawkins not to come to
the units or told Mr. Hawkins he was no longer welcome.
Moreover, on cross-examination, both Gloria Markham and Tim
Markham conceded they never evicted Mr. Hawkins from the units.
Tr., Vol. 1, at 113, 170.
While the State's evidence lacks any mention that the
Markhams told Mr. Hawkins he was no longer welcome in the units,
it is replete with evidence that after October 1995, Gloria
Markham, Tim Markham and Jim Severns repeatedly urged and invited
Mr. Hawkins to come to the units.
42; Tr., Vol. 2, at 19-20.

Tr., Vol. 1, at 108-09, 141-

Gloria Markham testified that Jim

Severns, Tim and Lisa "all the time" would call the business
where John worked to ask John to retrieve his property.
Vol. 1, at 108-09.

Tim Markham testified,

xx

Tr.,

[John] was called

three or four or ten or twenty times, and we told him to move the

9

car . . . we told him to come get his dragster."
141.

Tr., Vol. 1, at

Tim Markham personally told Mr. Hawkins to u[c]ome get your

stuff."

Tr., Vol. 1, at 142.

Jim Severns spoke with John three

or four times and told John the landlord and Mr. Markham wanted
Mr. Hawkins to come to the units to remove his belongings.

Tr.,

Vol. 2, at 19-20.
Unit 99 was allegedly burgled at approximately 4:00 a.m.
on January 13, 1996.

At that time Jim Severns was in his unit

and heard two cars running in the complex.
14-15.

Tr., Vol 2, at 11,

Concerned with a rash of thefts that had occurred in the

area, Mr. Severns investigated,.

Tr., Vol. 2, at 11.

When Mr.

Severns walked outside he saw "two cars parked there, and the
drivers were talking to each other."

Tr., Vol. 2, at 11.

At

that point one car headed west and the other pulled up in front
of Mr. Severns' unit.

Tr., Vol. 2, at 11.

driven by Mr. Hawkins.

The latter car was

Tr., Vol. 2, at 11.

Mr. Hawkins asked

Mr. Severns what he was doing there, and Mr. Severns asked the
same of Mr. Hawkins.

Tr., Vol. 2, at 11.

versation Mr. Hawkins "seemed nervous."

During that con-

Tr., Vol. 2, at 52.

When asked what he was doing there, Mr. Hawkins stated he was
looking for his dog.

Tr., Vol. 2, at 12.

Shortly thereafter,

Mr. Hawkins' dalmatian ran around the corner and jumped into the

10

car Mr. Hawkins was driving.
then drove off.

Tr., Vol. 2, at 12.

Mr. Hawkins

Tr., Vol. 2, at 12.

Mr. Severns spoke with Mr. Hawkins two other times that
morning.
a.m.

The next conversation occurred at approximately 4:12

Tr., Vol. 2, at 13-14.

During that conversation

Mr. Hawkins told Mr. Severns he had driven by the shop and had
seen that the door was open.

Tr., Vol. 2, at 14.

Mr. Hawkins

called back a few minutes later and asked Mr. Severns to get all
of Mr. Hawkins' belongings out of the units for him.
2, at 14.

Tr., Vol.

After the second call Mr. Severns went back to sleep.

Tr., Vol. 2, at 15.
Mr. Severns woke up around 6:30 a.m.

Tr., Vol. 2, at 15.

Mr. Severns then left his unit and walked to the other end of the
yard as he usually did each morning.

Tr., Vol. 2, at 15.

When

Mr. Severns walked by unit 98 he noticed the bottom of the rollup garage door had been kicked in.

Tr., Vol. 2, at 15.

Mr. Severns contacted Gloria and Tim Markham concerning what had
occurred.

Tr., Vol. 2, at 16.

Gloria Markham, Tim Markham and

Jim Severns inspected the units and discovered several items were
missing including items belonging to Mr. Hawkins and items belong
to Mr. Markham.

Tr., Vol. 2, at 16; State's Exhibits, 3 & 4.

They also noticed puppy footprints on the furniture.

11

Tr., Vol.

1, at 126; Tr., Vol. 2, at 18.

None of the missing items has

been recovered.
Based on the foregoing evidence, the jury found Mr.
Hawkins guilty of burglary.
VIII.
A.

R. at 168.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS

The State Failed to Offer Sufficient Evidence to
Prove an Unlawful Entry or Remaining.

Mr. Hawkins could not have committed an unlawful entry
because he had the express permission of the leaseholders to
enter and remain on the property.

Prior to the alleged burglary,

the Markhams gave Mr. Hawkins two express grants of authority to
enter the units.

First, in the summer of 1995, the Markhams

entered into a lease agreement with Mr. Hawkins in connection
with the use of the units and knew Mr. Hawkins regularly entered
both units.

The lease agreement, "license" and "privilege" were

never revoked and Mr. Hawkins was never evicted.

Second, begin-

ning in November 1995, the Markhams repeatedly urged and invited
Mr. Hawkins to return to the units to remove his belongings.
These two specific grants of authority by the Markhams
vested in Mr. Hawkins the lawful right, or license, to enter and
remain in the units.

Accordingly, no unlawful entry or remaining

could have occurred.

12

B.

The State Failed to Offer Sufficient Evidence to
Show Mr. Hawkins Entered or Remained in Unit 99 with
the Specific Intent to Commit a Felony, Theft or
Assault on Any Person.

At trial, the State failed to offer any evidence to show
Mr. Hawkins possessed a specific criminal intent to commit a
theft when he entered or remained in unit 99.

The State offered

no evidence to show Mr. Hawkins entered unit 99 with any purpose
in mind other than to remove his belongings.
IX.

ARGUMENT

In order to support a burglary conviction, the State must
establish two elements.

State v. Sisneros, 631 P.2d 856 (Utah

1981); State v. Brooks, 631 P.2d 878 (Utah 1981).

The State must

show first that the accused entered or remained unlawfully, and
second, that the accused did so with the intent to commit a
theft.

Id.

In this case, the State failed to introduce suffi-

cient evidence to establish either prong.
A.

Mr. Hawkins Did Not Commit an Unlawful Entry Because
He Entered the Property in Question with the
Permission of the Property Possessors.

Utah's burglary statute specifically requires that the
State prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, the accused committed an
unlawful entry or remaining.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202(1).

order to show an unlawful entry or remaining, the State must
prove the accused entered or remained on the premises without
13

In

license or privilege.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-201(3).

If the

State fails to make that showing or, as in this case, offers in
its case-in-chief unrefuted evidence showing the accused entered
or remained on the property with the permission of the property
holder, the burglary conviction must be vacated.

See State v.

Harper, 785 P.2d 1341 (Kan. 1990) (interpreting a similar
statute).

Thus, a burglary conviction cannot stand where the

undisputed evidence shows the accused received the express and
unrestricted permission to enter the property in question and
that permission was not thereafter revoked.
1.

Unlawful Entry Requires an Entry That Is Made
Without the Authority of the Property Holder.

The first element of the crime of burglary may be established by showing the accused committed an unlawful entry.
Code Ann. § 76-6-202(1).

Utah

However, this element was not designed

to make criminals out of those who enter with the alleged
victim's permission.

Historically, "the law was not ready to

punish one who had been invited in any way to enter the dwelling.
The law sought only to keep out intruders, thus anyone given
authority to come into the house could not be committing a
breaking when he so entered."

W. LaFave and A. Scott, Handbook

on Criminal Law § 96, p. 708.

14

Modern burglary statutes, such as Utah's, which require
an unlawful entry, are generally interpreted as retaining this
aspect of the common law.
(1979) .

State v. Thibeault. 402 A.2d 445

In Thibeault. the Maine Supreme Court explained:

In other jurisdictions, . . . the word "breaking" has
been eliminated and a word or phrase such as
"unlawful," "unauthorized" or "without license or
privilege" has been inserted in the statute to qualify
"entry." Where such language has been employed in a
burglary statute, the result has generally been to
retain so much of the breaking elements as required a
trespassory entry while at the same time eliminating
the illogical rules stemming from the "force" aspect of

breaking. Of course, where the stature requires a
trespassory
entry, the lawful possessor's
consent is a
complete
defense.
Id. (emphasis supplied).
Utah has retained the common law element that a trespass
is necessary to satisfy the first element of the offense.

As

such, and in addition to the plain language of the statute,
consent of the possessor remains a complete defense.
State v. Harper, 785 P.2d 1341 (Kan. 1990) was decided
under very similar facts and interprets a nearly identical
statute.

There, the Kansas Supreme Court reversed a burglary

conviction where the defendant had permission to enter the
building at issue.

Id. at 1349.

"Dukes," owned a softball complex.

The alleged victim in Harper.
Id. at 1342.

Harper to construct a garage on the complex.
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Dukes hired

Thereafter, Dukes

hired Harper as head groundskeeper for the complex for the 1986
season.

Dukes gave Harper a key to the complex so Harper could

carry out his duties as groundskeeper.

Dukes did not restrict

Harper's access to the complex and, in fact, gave Harper
permission to stay in the building overnight "to take care of
business or if he was too intoxicated to drive."

Id.

When the garage was not completed by the end of the 1986
season, Dukes asked Harper to return the keys.

Harper told Dukes

he needed the keys to retrieve his belongings.

Dukes did not

press the issue and let Harper keep the keys.

At no time there-

after did Dukes tell Harper he could not enter the building or
stay overnight.

Furthermore, there was no indication Harper

continued to work for Dukes after Dukes requested return of the
keys.

Id.
In April 1987, at approximately 2:00 a.m., presumably

some four or five months after the end of the softball season,
Harper entered the complex using the key Dukes had provided him.
Once inside, Harper broke into a filing cabinet and removed files
belonging to Dukes.

Id. at 1343.

charged and convicted of burglary.

16

Defendant was subsequently
Id.

The Kansas Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding
that the State failed to satisfy the element of unlawful entry.
The Court reasoned:
Dukes' testimony established that he gave defendant a
key and allowed him, in essence, full access to the
building at all hours, including the authority to stay
overnight. Although Dukes apparently asked for the
keys back, he did not receive them and was aware that
defendant still retained the keys. Furthermore, Dukes
did not restrict defendant's ability to have access to
the building by placing any specific limitation upon
the access given through the possession of a key. The
State's suggestion, by its leading question, and the
finding by the Court of Appeals that defendant did not
have permission to be in the building at 2:00 a.m. was
[sic] contradicted in the answer given by Dukes.3
Defendant did have authority to be in the building at
2:00 a.m.
Id. at 1345.
If a burglary statute requires an unlawful entry which is
defined as an entry made without license or privilege, an unlawful entry cannot occur where the accused was given permission to

3ux

Q [by prosecutor]: Well, did he have permission to be in
there at two in the morning?
A [by Dukes]: That particular night, no.
Q: Had he before that?
A: I do recall making the statement the year before that if
he needed to get in and take care of business or, you know
he got - he got where he couldn't drive home because he was
intoxicated or something, that he could stay on my couch. I
will admit that. But he didn't have my permission to be
there; at that time . . . .'"
17

enter unless and until that permission is withdrawn prior to
entry.

People v. Barefield, 804 P.2d 1342, 1345 (Colo. App.

1990) (citing People v. Carstensen. 420 P.2d 820 (Colo. 1966)).
2.

Mr. Hawkins Could Not Have Committed an
Unlawful Entry Because He Entered the Property
with the Permission of the Leaseholders.

The State's case in chief clearly demonstrated that
Mr. Hawkins entered unit 99 with the Markhams' permission,
license and privilege.

Indeed, the Markhams gave Mr. Hawkins two

express grants of authority to enter, either of which was sufficient to allow him to enter the unit lawfully.

The first grant

of authority was the un-revoked lease agreement the Markhams
entered into with Mr. Hawkins.

The second grant of authority

came by means of the repeated invitations the Markhams extended
Mr. Hawkins to remove his belongings from both units 98 and 99.
a.

The lease agreement Mr. Hawkins had with the
Markhams vested in him the lawful right to
enter unit 99 and Mr. Markham Ratified Mr.
Hawkins' Open and Notorious Entry of Unit 99.

Mr. Hawkins did not commit an unlawful entry because he
had a valid lease agreement that was never terminated.

In the

summer of 1995, Mr. Hawkins entered into a lease with the
Markhams.

Tr., Vol. 1, at 13 6, 13 8, 14 0, 67, 71.

testified that the initial lease was for unit 98.
at 169.

Mr. Markham
Tr., Vol. 1,

However, the record reveals one of two necessary
18

conclusions.

First, the scope of the lease extended to both

units 98 and 99.

According to Mr. Markham, the monthly rent was

calculated at one-half the monthly rental for both

units.

Id.

Units 98 and 99 were connected by an interior door which had no
lock.

Tr., Vol. 1, at 148.

It was known anyone with access to

unit 98 had access to unit 99.

Furthermore, Mr. Markham gave Mr.

Hawkins permission to use tools which were located in unit 99 and
thus license to enter unit 99.

Tr., Vol. 1, at 159, 171.

Mr.

Hawkins also kept his belongings there and his work in both units
was open and notorious.
Vol. 2, at 10, 33.

Tr., Vol. 1, at 140, 157, 172-73; Tr.,

Finally, according to Mr. Severns, it

appeared as if Mr. Hawkins was leasing both units.

Tr., Vol. 2,

at 34.
Second, regardless of whether the initial lease agreement
went to both units, or whether the conduct of the parties modified the lease agreement to reach both units, the record is clear
that Mr. Hawkins had full, unrestricted access to both units 98
and 99.

Mr. Markham invited Mr. Hawkins' entry into unit 99 by

offering the use of his tools, and ratified Mr. Hawkins' entry
into unit 99 by never objecting to Mr. Hawkins' repeated, open
and notorious entries into the unit.

Thus, whether the lease

extended to both units or Mr. Hawkins was merely licensed to
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enter unit 99, the record establishes Mr. Hawkins had both the
license and privilege to enter unit 99 without restriction.
Mr. Hawkins' right to access unit 99 was never terminated
or revoked.

Both Markhams conceded on cross-examination that

they never evicted Mr. Hawkins from either unit.
113, 170.

Tr., Vol. 1, at

Furthermore, there is nothing in the record to

indicate either Tim or Gloria Markham ever told Mr. Hawkins he
was no longer welcome.

Indeed, there is no evidence even to this

day the Markhams have sought the return of the key they provided
Mr. Hawkins to access the units.
These facts were materially identical to the facts in
Harper.

In both cases, the alleged victim testified he gave the

accused, in essence, full access to the building at all hours,
including the authority to stay overnight.

Neither victim

restricted defendant's ability to enter the building by placing
any specific limitations on access.

The only evidence suggesting

the accused lacked authority to enter the property on the night
in question was an improper question concerning whether the
alleged victim gave the accused permission to enter on the night
in question which was contradicted by the victim's own
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testimony;4 questions which, in effect, elicited legal
conclusions.
Mr. Markham's legal conclusion and his unexpressed
feeling that he did not want Mr. Hawkins to enter were irrelevant
and inconsistent with his own testimony.

First, after Mr.

Markham testified he entered into a lease with Mr. Hawkins, the
State had the burden to show the lease was terminated or Mr.
Hawkins was evicted.

There was no such showing.

Second, Mr. Markham's claim that Mr. Hawkins did not have
his permission to be in the units on the night in question does
not follow.

Mr. Markham leased the units to Mr. Hawkins and

repeatedly ratified Mr. Hawkins' entry into unit 99.

In addi-

tion, on numerous occasions Mr. Markham invited, and in fact
urged, Mr. Hawkins to return to the units to remove his belongings.

Neither of those two grants of authority was ever

rescinded.

Indeed, the state objected when Mr. Hawkins, while

testifying, produced the key to access the units.

Tr., Vol. 2,

at 169.

4xx

Q. (Prosecutor) xDid [Mr. Hawkins] have your permission
to be in either unit 99 or 98 on January the 13th?
A. (Mr. Markham) No, absolutely not.'"

Tr., Vol. 1, at 149.

See supra, footnote 3, which quotes the similar exchange in
Harper.
21

The law does not permit a property possessor to invite
another to enter his property, and then, months after the fact,
claim to revoke that permission when he does not like the result.
If Mr, Markham did not want Mr. Hawkins to return to the units,
he was required to make that known.

He did not do so.

The Markhams granted Mr. Hawkins the license and
privilege to enter both units 98 and 99.

They never revoked that

license by terminating the lease, evicting Mr. Hawkins or
informing him he was no longer welcome.

Therefore, as a matter

of law, Mr. Hawkins could not have committed an unlawful entry.
b.

The Markhams granted Mr. Hawkins license and
privilege to enter unit 99 when they repeatedly
asked Mr. Hawkins to return to remove his
belongings.

In addition to the license granted Mr. Hawkins via the
lease agreement and Mr. Markham7s invitation and ratification of
Mr. Hawkins' open and notorious entry into unit 99, the Markhams'
repeated invitations that he return to the units to remove his
belongings also vested in Mr. Hawkins a lawful right to enter
unit 99.

Mr. Hawkins left a number of personal possessions in

the units.

Tr., Vol. 1, at 108, 139; Tr a , Vol.2, at 17; State's

Exhibit 4.5

According to the Markhams, they wanted those items

5

Indeed, the Markhams testified they charged him for storing
his property in the Units [Defendant's Ex. 6 ] , which evinces an
22

removed.

Gloria Markham testified that Jim Severns, Tim and Lisa

had called Mr. Hawkins' work "all the time" and told him to come
get his property.

Tr., Vol. 1, at 108-09.

Tim Markham testified

that he and others called Mr. Hawkins as many as twenty times and
told him to remove his belongings.

Tr., Vol. 1, at 141.

Finally, Jim Severns testified he personally told Mr. Hawkins
that Mr. Gordon and Mr. Markham wanted

Mr. Hawkins to come back

to the units to pick up his property.

Tr., Vol. 2, at 19-20.

Pursuant to the Markhams' repeated requests, Mr. Hawkins
returned to the units and removed his belongings.

Even if

Mr. Hawkins took property from unit 99 that did not belong to
him, he would be a thief, but not a burglar.

Jackson v. State,

259 So.2d 739, 744 (Fla. App. 1972) (Justice McNulty,
concurring).
The Markhams entered into a lease agreement with Mr.
Hawkins granting him complete and unrestricted access to units 98
and 99.

That lease was never terminated either by act or

implication.

Thereafter, the Markhams extended an open

invitation to Mr. Hawkins to return to the units to remove his

additional indicia of his license and privilege to enter. If two
people are sharing a storage unit and each has a key, they each
have license to enter. The removal by one person of more
property than he owns does not make him a burglar.
23

belongings.

The Markhams placed no restrictions on Mr. Hawkins

concerning when he could return to the units or whether someone
else must be present when he did so.

These two express grants of

authority vested in Mr. Hawkins both the license and privilege to
enter unit 99.

Therefore, Mr. Hawkins could not have committed

an unlawful entry.
B.

Mr. Hawkins Did Not Commit an Unlawful Remaining
Because His Permission to Enter the Premises Was Not
Revoked.

Mr. Hawkins entered unit 99 pursuant to two specific
grants of authority from the Markhams.
That permission was never revoked.

supra.

See Argument, (A),

Therefore, Mr. Hawkins could

not have committed an unlawful remaining.
1.

Unlawful Remaining Requires a Presence in or on
a Property Which Continues After Authority to
Enter Is Revoked.

If there is no unlawful entry, the State must show an
unlawful remaining in order to sustain a burglary charge.
Code Ann. § 76-6-201(3).

Utah

Unlawful remaining applies "where the

defendant's initial entry is authorized, but at some later time
that person's presence becomes unauthorized."

State v. Bradley,

752 P.2d 874, 876 (Utah 1985) (citing State v. Brown, 630 P.2d
731 (Kan. 1981)) .

Thus, in order for an unlawful remaining to

occur, the initial authority to enter must be revoked.
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or remaining was without license or privilege."

People v.

Hutchinson. 124 Misc. 2d 487, 490, 477 N.Y.S.2d 965, 967 (Sup. Ct
1984), aff'd,
dismissed,

121 A.2d 849, 503 N.Y.S.2d 702 (1986),

appeal

68 N.Y.2d 770, 506 N.Y.S.2d 1054, 498 N.E.2d 156

(1986); People v. Crowell. 470 N.Y.S.2d 306 (1983).
Hutchinson court explained that

The

finding that the commission of a

crime constitutes an unlawful remaining would "impermissibly
[broaden] the scope of liability for burglary, making a burglary
of anyone who commits a crime on someone else's premises."

Id.

Indeed, as the drafters of the Model Penal Code noted, taken to
its extreme, such an interpretation would lead to the even more
absurd result of making a burglar out of one who entered his own
home to prepare a fraudulent tax return or assault his wife.
Model Penal Code and Commentaries. Part II § 221.1, p. 64-65
(1980) .
Similar reasoning was used in People v. Crowell. 470
N.Y.S.2d 306 (1983), where the court granted Crowell's motion to
dismiss a burglary indictment because he had been granted
permission to enter the victim's home and that permission was
never revoked.

Id. at 307-08.

Crowell to paint his home.

There, the alleged victim hired

Id. at 307.

The homeowner gave

Crowell a key to the home and allowed him access to store
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Crowell was indicted for burglar \
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indictment, reasoning as follows:
In this case, the defendant clearly was licensed or
privileged to be in the victim's building. Neither the
victim here nor any owner would ever intend that his
permission to enter or remain would extend to accommodate a thief. However, the privilege to be within.
the premises is not negated by the formulation of
criminal intent, or even the undertaking of criminal
actions therein. . . . Upon reflection, it will be
seen that not terminating one's license or privilege
upon his commission of criminal conduct makes both
practical and theoretical sense. A r i 1] e to the
contrary would mean that an intoxicated guest who loses
his temper and intentionally smashes a vase becomes a
burglar. Innumerable like examples can be imagined.
Such was not the intent of the legislature in creating
the burglary statute, all of which have trespassorial
conduct as one essential element. Clearly,
to
constitute a burglary,
this
conduct
must exist
separately
from and independently
of the criminal
intent.
Id. (emphasis supplied).
Thus,

:i f t l le a c c u s e d ei rt:e:i : s til: le prop ei : t y i u: 1 i e r

tl le

authority of license or privilege, the possessor must revoke that
authority before an unlawful remaining can occur

"I J'ithout the

necessary revocation, a burqlary cannot occur regardless of what
the license holder's intent may b e .
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2.

Mr. Hawkins Did Not Commit an Unlawful
Remaining Because His Permission to Enter the
Property Was Never Revoked.

The State failed to offer any evidence that Mr. Hawkins'
lawful right to remain in unit 99 was ever revoked.
unlawful remaining did not occur.

As such, an

Once the State demonstrated

Mr. Hawkins had a lawful right to enter unit 99, it had the
burden to show Mr. Hawkins' presence became unauthorized.
v. Bradley, 752 P.2d 874, 876 (Utah 1985).
such showing.

State

Here, there was no

Accordingly, the State failed to satisfy the

essential element of an unlawful remaining.
Nothing in the record shows Mr. Hawkins' license or
privilege to enter unit 99 was either implicitly or expressly
revoked.

First, Mr. Hawkins' license to remain was not

implicitly revoked.

An implicit revocation occurs, for example,

when the actor enters a property and thereafter hides in or on
the property knowing his authority to remain will terminate at
some point.

Such was not the case here.

Mr. Hawkins returned to

the units in the early morning hours as had been his practice.
Accordingly, there was no implicit revocation.
Seqond, Mr. Hawkins' authority to remain was not
explicitly revoked.

Explicit revocation occurs when the property

possessor expressly communicates to the actor that he is no

28

property possessors, Gloria and Tim Markham, were not present
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remove his belongings.
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Accordingly, the Markhams did not, and

indeed could not, expressly revoke Mr. Hawkins' license to remain
:

9.
The testimony of the so-called victims in t;.:s case

established that they expressly and repeatedly vestea

*r.

Hawkins the lawful right to enter both units 98 and 99. '.n*w
never thereafter revoked that license or privilege.

Therefore,

as a n: Latte: : :: f 1 a ; i
unlawful remaining.
£^ ^ T ^ e state Failed to offer burr
Show Mr. Hawkins Possessed the
Necessary to Support a Burglary L

. nivi.
•=*"

10

r

In addition to establishing an unlawful entry or

Code Ann. § 76-6-202,': ; . A:: i-ct is committed with intent when it
is the actor's conscious objective or desire to engage in the
conduct or c ause the result.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103 (1) .

;

Evidence of burglarious intent is rarely, if ever,
susce* •
1177 (Utah 198'-.

State 'v

I orter, ; 05 I 2- i II 1 7 1 ,

It is usually inferred from circumstantial

1 :i E

evidence: the manner of entry, the time of day, the character and
contents of the building, the person's actions after the entry,
the totality of the circumstances, and the intruder's explanation."

Id.

In light of these criteria, the act of entry, alone,

is insufficient to prove intent.

State v. Johnson. 771 P.2d

1071, 1072-72 (Utah 1989) .
The majority of the modern Utah Supreme Court cases
addressing the element of criminal intent under the burglary
statute have two common themes.

State v. Porter, 705 P.2d 1174

(Utah 1985); State v. Johnson. 771 P.2d 1071 (Utah 1989); State
v. Pitts, 728 P.2d 113 (Utah 1986); State v. Isaacson. 704 P.2d
555 (Utah 1985); State v. Wilson. 701 P.2d 1058 (Utah 1985);
State v. Sisneros, 631 P.2d 856 (Utah 1981); State v. Brooks. 631
P.2d 878 (Utah 1981).

First, the initial entry was unauthorized,

and second, the entry occurred under unusual or suspicious circumstances.

In Brooks. for example, Brooks pried off a screen at

approximately 11:00 p.m. in order to gain access to a stranger's
apartment.
minutes.

Brooks stayed in the apartment for approximately 15
While inside, he turned off three or four switches on a

power panel.

In Johnson, the defendant entered a stranger's

locked apartment.

Once inside Johnson partially shut the door,

wandered around the apartment and opened a jewelry box owned by
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Reasonable minds could not infer a criminal intent
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and contents of the building, M r . Hawkins' actions after entry,
or his explanation of why he was at the unit on the night in
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evinces an occurrence which was expected and commonplace with
respect to the parties.
First, there was nothing suspicious or unusual concerning
the manner in which Mr. Hawkins entered the units,

roll-up garage door.

Mi : Hawkins

Mr. Markham testified he knew Mi

Hawkins

o f t ei I wou 1 d access 11 ie uni t s • ii i I 1 1 Iat f a s hi oi I when he f orgot his
key.

Tz .,

w

w*.. 1, at 13 8.

There is nothing in the record to

suggest M r , Markham objected to this method of access by
]> Ii

I lawk: i is

-- •

the manner of entry because Mr. Hawkins regularly accessed the

-->m

units by rolling under the garage door with the knowledge and
consent of Mr. Markham.
Second, no inference of a culpable mental state can be
drawn from the time of day Mr. Hawkins entered the units.
According to Messrs. Markham and Severns, Mr. Hawkins frequently
worked in the units in the early morning hours and, at times,
would spend the entire night there.
Vol. 2, at 34.
object.

Tr., Vol. 1, at 138; Tr.,

Mr. Markham was aware of this fact and did not

Although working at four o'clock in the morning may not

be common for most people, it was typical for Mr. Hawkins.
Accordingly, no inference of criminal intent can be drawn from
the time of day Mr. Hawkins entered the units.
Finally, no inference of criminal intent can be drawn
from Mr. Hawkins' actions after entry or his explanation
concerning his presence on or near the property.

Mr. Severns saw

Mr. Hawkins shortly after 4:00 a.m. on the morning of the theft.
Mr. Severns asked Mr. Hawkins what he was doing there.
2, at 11.

Tr., Vol.

Mr. Hawkins responded he was looking for his dog.

Mr. Hawkins' dog then ran around the corner and jumped into
Mr. Hawkins' car.

Mr. Hawkins then left the area.

Id.

There is also no logical connection between the criminal
intent one must have upon entering the property and what occurred
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M r , Hawkins said he was
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Even if M r . Hawkins' later conduct in talking to M r .
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doing, :i f any, was M r
Mr. Severns?

More specifically, what wrong-

Hawkins trying to cover up b y talking with

Assuming M r . Hawkins committed a theft while inside

the units, his subsequent conduct would have been to evade
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Therefore, the fact that I l:i : 1 lawkins was less

candid witl I Mr: , Severns when asked what he w a s doing there was
not indicative of a guilty mind with respect to a burglary.
Under the totality of the circumstances, the evidence or. r.his
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parties, rather than evidence which is indicative of a culpable
mental state.
X. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant respectfully requests
the Court to reverse the verdict of guilty of the burglary charge.
XI.

REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT

Defendant requests oral argument because of the novelty of
the issues presented under Utah law.
DATED this 16th day of December, 1997.
Attorneys for Appellant

Edward R. Montgomery

SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

Richard A. Van
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF
THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, DIVISION I, STATE 01 IITAII

NI'AII n | HI ,\||.
Plaintiff,
V.

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S
RULE 23 MOTION TO ARREST OF
JUDGMENT

JOHN D. HAWKINS,
Trial Court No. 961900499FS
Defendant.
Judge: Wilkinson
This matter came before the Court pursuant to the Defendant's Rule 23 Motion To Arrest
Judgment. Upon review ot Defendant's motion and the court record, the Court Finds:
1. There was sufficient evidence presented to sustain the jury's verdict of guilt with
respect to the burglary charge; and
2. ThiW- v.vns mifficvr * < \ iiltMu e rvvsmft* f "

' •

"

** (1 , r \

Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendant's Motion to Arrest Judgment.

The r lonorable Homer Wilkinson

0*v J

S7s

Edward R. Montgomery
Attorney for Defendant

«&l Castk
eputy District Attorney
Attorney for Plaintiff.

")- V~

( ' i 1 (nilill11nI 11111" 1 1 ( i i 1 1 1 ,

I certify that on May 23, 1997,1 served copies of the above Order by placing copies of the
^iinr in ihif I Imirrl Sf'iip*- M'liil postage prepaid rind i'ldressed ris lollow s:

E. Neal Gunnarson, District Attorney for Salt Lake County
Cy H. Castle, Deputy District Attorney
2001 S. State # F 3700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1210

DATED Vr

Edward XTMontgomery
Attorney for Defendant
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Edward R. Montgomery
Utah Bar No. 7583
136 South Main, Suite 404
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
(801)359-2368
Counsel for Defen \i i it
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF
THE

^ r O F S A T T T A K F , DTVTSTON T —

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
v.

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT

JOHN D. HAWKINS,
Trial Court No. 961900499FS
Defendant.
Judee: Wilkii ison
This matter came before the Court pursuant to the Defendant's Motion for a Directed
WrJit I 11 i ing heard the evidence presented and listened to the argument by counsel, the Court.
finds:
1. The State presented sutiicient evidence to support a prima facie case of burglary; and
2. The State presented sufficient evidence to support ;i pi ini.i farir f.F.e of fhrft.
Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendant's Motion for a Directed Verdict.
DATED M.- "'

1(

-

The Honorable Homer Wilkinson

O |?H

Prepared and presented by:
Edward RfM&rftgomery
Attorney for Defendant
Approved as to form and content:

v-- -

Deputy District Attorney
Attorney ror Plaintiff.

u&

Certificate of Mailing
I certify that on May 23, 1997,1 served copies of the above Order by placing copies of the
same in the United States Mail postage prepaid and addressed as follows:

E. Neal Gunnarson, District Attorney for Salt Lake County
Cy H. Castle, Deputy District Attorney
2001 S. State # F 3700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1210

DATED May 23, 1997

Edward R/Monmomer\
jomery
Attorney for Defendant

7-n

Edward R. Montgomery
Utah Bar No. 7583
136 South Main, Suite 404
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
(801)359-2368
Counsel for Defendant

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF
THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, DIVISION I, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
V.

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S
RULE 24 MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL

JOHN D. HAWKINS,
Trial Court No. 961900499FS
Defendant.
Judge: Wilkinson

This matter came before the Court pursuant to the Defendant's Rule 24 Motion for a New
Trial. Upon review of Defendant's motion and the court record, the Court Finds:
1. There was sufficient evidence presented to sustain the jury's verdict of guilt with
respect to the burglary charge; and
2. The jury was properly instructed with respect to the legal elements necessary to support
a charge of burglary.
Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendant's Rule 24 Motion for a New Trial.
DATED this ^

Day of May, 1997

-7 pA 7 - ? ^ ^ ^ —
/

The Honorable Homer Wilkinson

a°to

Prepared and presented by:
idward K. Montgomery
Attorney for Defendant
Approved as to form and content:

Castl
eputy(District Attorney
Attorney for Plaintiff.

a«\\

Certificate of Mailing
I certify that on May 23, 1997,1 served copies of the above Order by placing copies of the
same in the United States Mail postage prepaid and addressed as follows:

E. Neal Gunnarson, District Attorney for Salt Lake County
Cy H. Castle, Deputy District Attorney
2001 S. State # F 3700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1210

DATED Mav 23, 1997

idward R. Montgomery
Attorney for Defendant

aq^-

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that on the 16th day of
December, 1997, I caused two (2) copies of the foregoing Brief of
Appellant to be served by first-class mail upon the following
party:
Christine Soltis
Assistant Attorney General
160 East 300 South, Suite 600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Counsel for Appellee
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